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Abstract
Two factors–the increase in international investment and the increase in international invest-
ment agreements–have together led to a growth in the number and severity of treaty-based disputes
between host states and individual investors. An increasing number of such disputes are being set-
tled through international arbitration. However, the large amounts of some resulting arbitration
awards, the cost to host countries of the arbitral process, and the constraints imposed thereby on
the ability of governments to regulate enterprises in their territories have raised questions as to
whether means other than arbitration and litigation can be found to resolve treaty-based, investor-
State disputes. In short, is there a better way than international arbitration to resolve at least some
investor-State disputes? The purpose of this Article is to explore alternative methods for settling
such conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth over the last two decades in the total stock
of international investment, now estimated at US$10 trillion,'
and the increasing number of international direct investors, at
present amounting to some 77,000 transnational corporations
and their 770,000 affiliates,2 have quite naturally led to an in-
crease in potential and actual conflicts between investors and
host countries.' Parallel to the growth in international invest-
ment has been the rapid increase in international investment
treaties among states, which now number nearly 2500' and in-
volve some 180 different countries." These agreements, which
include bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), 6 regional agree-
* Henry J. Braker Professor of Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University. This Article is based on a study which the author conducted at the
request of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"),
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), and the Secretaria de Economia of Mex-
ico and presented at the APEC-UNCTAD Regional Seminar on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Key Substantive and Procedural Issues in Mexico City, Mexico, October 9-
10, 2006.
1. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2006: #7)1
from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 9, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/W1R/2006 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/
WebFlyer.asp?intLtemID=3968&lang=l [hereinafter UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2006].
2. See id. at 10.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 26 (reporting that by the end of 2005, the total number of bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs") was 2495).
5. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation
Treaties, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intltemD=3150&lang=l
(last visited Sept. 15, 2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on BITs & DTTs]
(reporting that by the end of 2003, 176 countries had concluded bilateral investment
treaties).
6. The literature and doctrinal commentary on BITs is abundant and have ex-
panded over the years as the number of BITs has grown. See generally, e.g., RUDOLF
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); M. SORNARAJAH,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 225-76 (1994); UNCTAD, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, 1959-1999, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/ILA /2 (2000), available at
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ments such as NAFTA, free trade agreements ("FrAs"), 7 and spe-
cial purpose accords such as the Energy Charter Treaty,' are
often concluded between industrialized countries and develop-
ing nations in order to protect and promote investment among
the countries concerned. In general, these agreements do two
things: (1) they subject host countries to a set of international
legal rules that they must respect in dealing with foreign inves-
tors and their investments and (2) they grant investors the right
to bring a claim in international arbitration autonomously and
without regard to the wishes of their home country against host
country governments that allegedly violate those rules.9 Such
treaties enable investors to convert a "conflict" (i.e., a perceived
difference of interests) with host governments, which might oth-
erwise be settled through informal means or domestic courts,
into a public international law "dispute" (i.e., a conflict that is
activated by the parties) to be settled by an international arbitra-
tion tribunal outside the jurisdiction of the host country.
These two factors-the increase in international investment
and the increase in international investment agreements-have
together led to a growth in the number and severity of treaty-
based disputes between host states and individual investors. An
increasing number of such disputes are being settled through
international arbitration; however, the large amounts of some
resulting arbitration awards, the cost to host countries of the ar-
bitral process, and the constraints imposed thereby on the ability
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiiad2.en.pdf; UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998); K.J. VANDEVELDE,
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992); Antonio R. Parra,
The Scope of New Investment Laws and International Instruments in Economic Development, in
ECONOMIC DEVELOPME,, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND LAw 27 (R. Pritchard ed., 1996);
Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT.- The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact
on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAw. 655 (1990). In addition, see
the website of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID") for materials on BITs, including the texts of many BITs, arbitration awards that
have interpreted and applied them, and a bibliography of books and articles comment-
ing on BITs. See ICSID, ICSID Bilateral Investment Treaties, at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
8. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, opened for signature Feb. 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 360
(1995).
9. SeeJeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evalua-
tion of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 67
(2005) (discussing the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties).
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of governments to regulate enterprises in their territories have
raised questions as to whether means other than arbitration and
litigation can be found to resolve treaty-based, investor-State dis-
putes. In short, is there a better way than international arbitra-
tion to resolve at least some investor-State disputes? The pur-
pose of this Article is to explore alternative methods for settling
such conflicts.
I. THE NATURE, CAUSES & SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
A. The Special Nature of Investor-State Disputes
Investor-State disputes arising under international invest-
ment treaties are not ordinary commercial disputes. Treaty-
based investor-State disputes are special, and their special nature
must be understood because it affects the ways in which the dis-
putants approach their conflict and the utility and effectiveness
of dispute resolution techniques employed to resolve that con-
flict.
First, such disputes are not a matter of simple contract
claims governed by contract law. They are disputes governed by
public international law in the form of treaties-instruments of
international law-solemnly entered into by two or more
states.' ° Given the international legal nature of these disputes,
unilateral attempts to deal with them through domestic laws and
regulations are usually unavailing.
Second, at the heart of many investor-State conflicts is a
public policy question. The host government has taken certain
measures-for example, legislative or administrative acts to pre-
serve the environment, to regulate business, or to impose a tax
considered necessary in the public interest-which the investor
10. As the ICSID Annulment Committee states in the Vivendi case, which involved
a dispute under the Argentina-France BIT:
A state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa...
whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a
breach of contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be deter-
mined by reference to its own proper or applicable law - in the case of the
BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession Contract by the proper
law of the contract ....
Compafifa de Aguas del Aconquia SA and Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie
Gn~rale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, decision on an-
nulment (3July 2002) 11 95, 96.
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challenges as violating its rights under a treaty. The resulting ar-
bitration decision or other form of settlement has significant im-
plications for the ability of sovereign governments to regulate
enterprises within their territories."l If an arbitration tribunal ul-
timately judges such measures to be illegal under the applicable
international law embodied in a treaty, the resulting arbitration
award may not only require the offending host government to
pay the investor substantial damages and to incur heavy arbitra-
tion costs, but it may also lead the host government to repeal or
modify such measures in order to avoid similar arbitration claims
from other foreign investors.
Third, because they involve public policy issues, investor-
State disputes are political in nature and often become highly
politicized, as political groups, non-governmental organizations,
the media, and ultimately the general public come to have defi-
nite views on the dispute and how it should be settled. The polit-
ical nature of the disputes, as will be seen, influences the strate-
gies of both governments and investors in seeking to resolve
them.
Fourth, underlying the dispute is an intended long-term in-
vestment relationship: A complex connection, often amounting
to a state of interdependence, between the investor and the host
country. In cases of privatization of public services, such as
water, gas, or telecommunications, the investor and the host
country are linked in a more or less permanent relationship that
is very difficult to unravel, far more difficult than that arising out
of a simple contract of sale of a commodity in international com-
merce. In such cases, the host country is dependent on the con-
tinued provision by the investor of the needed public service and
at least in the short run has no other option but to continue to
deal with the investor. Similarly, the investor, having committed
substantial capital to the privatized enterprise, is dependent on
the host country for continued revenues and at least in the short
run has few options with respect to selling its investment.
Fifth, the amounts of money at stake in the dispute are
large, sometimes staggeringly so, reaching in some cases to hun-
dred of millions, even billions of dollars. As a result, in most in-
11. See Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours
of the International System of Investor Protection, 12 REv. INT'L POL. ECON. 600, 610-11
(2005).
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vestor-State, treaty-based disputes, a host country faces the risk of
having to pay a substantial arbitration award in an amount that,
in relation to the country's budget and financial resources, may
prove onerous. Whereas the average award in an ordinary inter-
national commercial arbitration is less than a million dollars, an
award in an investor-State arbitration is usually many times
that. 2 For example, arbitral tribunals rendered awards of
US$355 million against the Czech Republic, 13 US$71 million
against Ecuador,14  US$824 million against Slovakia,15 and
US$133 million against Argentina.1 6
Moreover, the costs of an investor-State arbitration are usu-
ally substantially greater than those in an ordinary commercial
dispute and may prove to be a significant burden for developing
countries. In addition to indirect costs such as the time of gov-
ernment officials and corporate executives devoted to preparing
and participating in the case, the direct costs usually consist of
two elements: (1) the expenses of party's legal representation
and (2) each party's share of the costs of administering the arbi-
tration. The precise amount of such costs will vary depending
on the complexity of the case, the amount in controversy, and
the extent of time needed to resolve it. In a highly complicated
12. See Noah D. Rubins, The Allocation of Costs and Attorney's Fees in Investor-State
Arbitration, 18 ICSID REv. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 109, 124-25 (2003) (observing that whereas
42 percent of the commercial arbitration claims brought under the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") in 1999 were for less than US$1 million, the average
claim for ICSID cases in 1997 was US$10 million).
13. See CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings Final Award,
161 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_
001.pdf (ordering that the Czech Republic pay US$269,814,000, plus interest, and that
arbitrator's fees in the amount of US$1,351,203.44 be borne by both parties equally);
Peter S. Green, Czech Republic Pays $355 Million to Media Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2003, at WI.
14. See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Final Award in
the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration, London Ct. Int'l Arb. Case No. UN3467, 73-
74 (July 1, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinal
Award_001.pdf (stating that Ecuador shall pay the claimant US$71,533,649, excluding
interest and arbitration costs).
15. See Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, 126 (Dec. 29, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uic.ca/documents/Cesk-
Slovakia-AwardDec2004.pdf (stating that the Slovak Republic shall pay the claimant
24,796,381,842 Slovak Crowns, plus interest).
16. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, 139 (May 12, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMS-Final
Award.pdf (stating that Argentina shall pay the claimant US$133,200,000 in compensa-
tion).
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and lengthy case, the costs of legal representation in an arbitra-
tion proceeding can be extremely heavy. For example, in CME
v. Czech Republic the Czech Republic reportedly spent US$10 mil-
lion on its legal defense.17 A more typical investor-State case is
perhaps Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, a
NAFTA case under United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") rules. There, the total cost of
the proceeding was US$3,170,692, including US$405,620 in arbi-
trators' fees and approximately US$99,632 in various administra-
tive expenses, US$1,502,065 in Mexico's legal representation
costs, and US$1,163,375 in Thunderbird's costs of representa-
tion."8
It is possible for a host country that wins a case to recoup
some of these costs from the investor who commenced the case;
however, the rules on apportionment of costs among the parties
vary and in any case are subject to significant discretion by the
tribunal. On the other hand, a host state that loses a case may
itself be required to pay a portion of the claimant investor's costs
in certain circumstances.
B. The Growth of Investor-State Disputes
In the last ten years, one of the most significant develop-
ments in contemporary international investment law has been
the growth of investor-State arbitration to settle investment dis-
putes. During the period 1987-2005 a total of 226 investor-State
treaty arbitrations had been brought,19 virtually all of which in-
volved private investors as claimants and states as respondents. 20
In the realm of international investment, investor-State arbitra-
tion has become increasingly common 2' and arbitral awards in-
terpreting and applying investment treaty provisions have be-
17. See Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic Hit with Massive Compensation Bill in In-
vestment Treaty Dispute, INv. L. & POL'Y WKLY NEWS BULL., Mar. 21, 2003, § 1, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-investsd_march_2003.pdf.
18. See Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award
in the Matter of NAFrA Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 68-72
Uan. 26, 2006), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunder-
bird/ThunderbirdAward.pdf.
19. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, supra note 1, at 27, 29 fig.I.15.
20. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2 (Jan. 16, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/webiteiit20052_en.pdf.
21. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, supra note 1, at 27.
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come increasingly numerous. 22 For international law firms, in-
vestor-State arbitration-once an arcane field of interest to only
a few scholars and specialists-has become an established and
lucrative area of legal practice.
Granting a private party the right to bring an action in an
international tribunal against a sovereign state with respect to an
investment dispute was once a revolutionary innovation that now
seems to be taken for granted. Prior to the development of in-
vestment treaties giving aggrieved investors a right to bring an
arbitration proceeding against a host country, investor-State arbi-
tration claims were relatively rare events that required specific
agreements by the parties to arbitrate disputes arising from spec-
ified investments. 2 3 In many (but not all) investment treaties, on
the other hand, host states provide an open-ended promise to
investors to arbitrate all claims relating to any investment cov-
ered by the treaty's provisions.
Although investor-State arbitration has become increasingly
common, the uniqueness and power of this form of legal process
should not be overlooked. There are few instances in interna-
tional law where a private party may compel a sovereign state to
defend the legality of that state's actions in an international fo-
rum and, if found liable, pay substantial damages for the injury
caused to the private party by such action. The field of interna-
tional trade law, for example, contains no similar procedure. Vi-
olations of trade law, even though they strike at the economic
interests of private parties, are matters resolved directly and
solely by states. The World Trade Organization ("WTO") does
not give a remedy to private persons injured by trade law viola-
tions.
It should also be noted that investment treaties usually grant
aggrieved investors the right to prosecute their claims autono-
mously, without regard to the concerns and interests of their
home countries. In the view of capital-exporting states and for-
eign investors, it is this mechanism that gives important, practi-
cal significance to international investment agreements, a mech-
22. See id.
23. See V. V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three
Ideas, 47 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-48 (1998) (discussing one of the first investor-
State arbitration cases).
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anism that truly enables these treaties to afford protection to for-
eign investment.
In almost all investor-State arbitrations, it is the investor who
is the claimant and the host state that is the respondent. Two
reasons may explain why states rarely initiate international arbi-
tration cases against investors. First, host states generally con-
sider their internal legal processes, namely their domestic regu-
latory powers and judicial functions, sufficient to handle their
claims against investors in the event of dispute. Second, bilateral
investment treaties grant investors rights but rarely impose on
them obligations that host states may enforce through arbitra-
tion. Thus, among the 133 concluded arbitration cases regis-
tered at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") in its history,24 only two as of 2006 were initi-
ated by states,25 and jurisdiction in both cases was based on con-
tracts with the investor, not investment treaties.2 6
C. The Potential Significance of the Growth of Investor-State Disputes
One may argue that the growth in treaty-based investor-
State disputes in recent years is purely a function of the vast in-
crease in international investment and the inevitability of con-
flict in any investment relationship and that investor-State dis-
putes are a natural and inevitable fact of international economic
life. On the other hand, one must also acknowledge that the
growth of investor-State disputes has certain potential negative
consequences both for the states and the investors concerned.
The costs of investor-State disputes are placing growing fi-
nancial and other hardships on individual countries, particularly
on poor, developing countries. The potential costs of an inves-
tor-State arbitration are basically threefold. First, as indicated
24. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.
htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
25. See Tanz. Elec. Supply Co. v. Indep. Power Tanz. Ltd., 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 220,
226 (2001) (describing the claimant, the Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, as
a public utility corporation that is entirely owned by the United Republic of Tanzania);
ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 24 (listing Gabon v. Sociitt Serte S.A., ICSID Case
No. ARB/76/1, and classifyin& a corporation, Socit Serte S.A., as the respondent).
26. See Tanz. Elec. Supply Co., 8 ICSID (W. Bank) at 227 (stating that the arbitration
arose out of a Power Purchase Agreement between the parties); William Rand, Robert
N. Hornick & Paul Friedland, ICSID's Emerging Jurisprudence: The Scope oflCSID'sJurisdic-
tion, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 33, 38 n.24 (1986) (describing the Gabon v. Socit#eSerte
S.A. case as having arisen out of a contract for the construction of a maternity ward).
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above, a host country faces the risk of having to pay awards that,
in relation to its budget and financial resources, may prove ex-
tremely burdensome. Second, the host country must bear the
substantial costs, both direct and indirect, of conducting the ar-
bitration itself. Third, the "policy cost" of investor-State arbitra-
tion is that a substantial award to the investor may require the
host country to repeal or modify measures that were imple-
mented for the public good.
The growing number of investor-State disputes may impose
indirect burdens on governments as well. Investment policy, like
any other government policy, needs to be sustained by a degree
of popular support. The public's realization of the costs in-
curred by host countries as a result of investor-State, treaty-based
disputes, which are often accompanied by significant publicity
and media comment, may lead to declining support for foreign
investment and for the policies of economic liberalization that
many countries have adopted over the last two decades.2 7 In
other words, continued public support for policies favoring for-
eign investment is not a foregone conclusion, and increases in
investor-State arbitration may contribute to additional restric-
tions on foreign investment in the future. Moreover, a high-pro-
file investor-State arbitration may be seen by other foreign inves-
tors as a negative reflection on the investment climate in the
host country, an indication that in reality the country concerned
is not as receptive to foreign investors as its government con-
tends. After all, the basis of any claim in a treaty-based, investor-
State arbitration is that the host country has violated its interna-
tional treaty commitments to investors.
In addition to the cost incurred by host countries and the
investors, investor-State arbitrations may also have negative con-
sequences for international relationships between host countries
and investor home countries. A high-profile, hotly litigated arbi-
tration between a foreign investor and a host country can nega-
tively affect governmental and public opinion in the investor's
home country toward the host country.
27. For example, an UNCTAD study found that from 1991 to 2002, "1,551 (95%)
out of 1,641 changes introduced by 165 countries in their FDI laws were in the direction
of greater liberalization." See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment
Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, 20, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/wir2003_en.pdf.
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Despite the examples of investors who have won large
awards as a result of a treaty-based, investor-State arbitration, the
idea that investor-State arbitration is a road to vast riches for in-
vestors is a gross exaggeration. Investor-State arbitration also en-
tails significant costs for the investor-costs that may not be
recouped from any eventual arbitral award. The costs to the in-
vestor have several dimensions. First are the financial costs in-
curred by the investor in hiring legal representation and paying
its share of the arbitration's administrative costs. Second are
costs incurred by having to devote significant executive time, ef-
fort, and concentration to the arbitration rather than to the in-
vestor's core business. Third are the relationship costs. A trans-
national corporation requires productive relationships with the
host governments, business communities, and publics of the
countries in which it operates. Initiating arbitration against a
host government will serve to rupture those relationships and
may even put in question its relationships with other countries
that are sympathetic to the host country respondent. Other host
countries may ask themselves: If this investor was willing to sue
country X, may it not also be willing to sue us? It was perhaps an
evaluation of these costs that led the former Chief Executive Of-
ficer ("CEO") of Metalclad, which ultimately won an award of
US$17 million against Mexico in a much noted case,28 to state
publicly that he found the whole arbitration process such a bur-
den that he wished he had settled his company's claim through
informal mechanisms, or what he called Metalclad's "political
options."2 9 Presumably, what he meant was that in hindsight in-
formal processes of dispute resolution might have been less
costly than the formal processes involved in investor-State arbi-
tration.
D. The Causes for the Growing Number of Investor-State Disputes
If the growing numbers of investor-State arbitrations is a
matter of concern that needs to be addressed, one must first un-
derstand the causes for the increase. One can identify at least six
possible reasons for increased recourse by investors to investor-
28. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 209, 235
(2000) (determining that Mexico shall pay Metalclad US$16,685,000, plus interest).
29. See Jack J. Coe, Jr. Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State
Disputes - A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAViS J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 7, 8 n.2 (2005).
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State arbitration: (1) the growing availability of arbitration as a
remedy; (2) the politics of investor-State disputes; (3) the occur-
rence of major crises; (4) the transformation of the global invest-
ment climate; (5) the development of facilitating factors; and
perhaps most important of all, (6) the perceived lack of satisfac-
tory dispute resolution alternatives to international arbitration
for the settlement of investor-State disputes. Each of these rea-
sons is examined in turn.
1. Growing Availability of Arbitration as a Remedy
A simple explanation for the growth of investor-State arbi-
tration is that a rapidly increasing number of investment treaties,
most of which have been signed since the early 1990s, have given
a growing number of investors a remedy that they never had
before to deal with perceived violations of their rights. Whereas
only 309 BITs had been concluded by the end of 1988,30 the
total number of BITs had reached nearly 2500 by the end of
2005,"' in addition to other important treaties, such as NAFTA
and the Energy Charter Treaty, which also provide for investor-
State arbitration. Moreover, various other bilateral international
treaties, such as the Free Trade Agreements advanced by the
United States32 and the Economic Partnership Agreements
("EPAs") promoted by Japan,". contain chapters on investment
that replicate the provisions of the BITs and provide for investor-
State arbitration. The result of this effort has been the creation
of an increasingly dense treaty network linking approximately
180 different countries.3' As a result of this process, a wide-
spread "treatification ''35 of international investment law has
30. See Athena J. Pappas, References on Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 ICSID REv. -
FOREIGN INv. L.J. 189, 194-203 (1989).
31. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, supra note 1, at 26.
32. See United States Trade Representative - Trade Agreements Home, http://
www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/SectionIndex.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (pro-
viding the texts of various free trade agreements concluded by the United States).
33. See Masaki Yasushi, Economic Partnership Agreements and Japanese Strategy, GAIKO
F. (Japan), Fall 2006, at 53 (asserting that Japan's bilateral trade relationships are in-
creasingly defined by economic partnership agreements).
34. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on BITs &DTTs, supra note 5 ("The number of
BITs has grown steadily; they numbered 385 by 1989, and 2,265 in 2003, encompassing
176 countries.").
35. The word "treatification," while not recognized by any standard English dic-
tionaries, has been used on rare occasions previously. See, e.g., Jing-dong Yuan, The
MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase, at v (May 2000) (Pa-
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taken place in a relatively short time. An important support for
this new architecture has been ICSID, which was formally estab-
lished in 1965 as an affiliate of the World Bank to resolve dis-
putes, primarily through international arbitration, between host
countries and foreign private investors. 6 Although ICSID did
not hear its first case until 1972, it was destined to become an
important institution for international investment dispute reso-
lution.37 By the end of 2005, for example, out of an estimated
cumulative total of 220 investor-State arbitrations initiated since
1987, 132 cases were brought before ICSID. 8
Thus, one important cause of the increase in investor-State
arbitration is simply the vast growth in foreign investment, the
number of foreign investors, and the number of treaties grant-
ing investors recourse to international arbitration.
2. The Politics of Investor-State Disputes
Investor-State disputes are not only legal, but also political
in nature. Indeed, it is the political dimension of such conflicts
that primarily preoccupy host government officials. Within indi-
vidual host countries, the public, political groups, and the media
often take positions on such disputes, and the nature and tenac-
ity of their views can influence how host country officials deal
with the investor and the dispute. This factor, for example, may
make it difficult for host country officials to negotiate a settle-
ment of a dispute since any negotiated settlement may be chal-
lenged by political opponents and the media as "selling out to
per prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme, Inter-
national Security Bureau, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR_
missile-e.pdf. The origin of the word "treaty" may perhaps be found in the 1908 Nobel
lecture of the Peace Prize Laureate Frederik Bajer, who urged that a treaty be estab-
lished to govern the canals between the North and Baltic seas. See Fredrik Bajer, Nobel
Lecture, The Organization of the Peace Movement (May 18, 1908), http://nobelprize.
org/peace/laureates/1908/bajer-lecture.html ("[T]here is a need to 'treatify', if I may
coin this expression, the waterways - the French call them 'canaux interocbaniques' -
which connect the two seas."); see alsoJeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatfication of Interna-
tional Investment Law, 13 LAw & Bus. REV. Am. 155, 155-66 (2007)."
36. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States pmbl., Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.ST. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
37. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 24 (listing concluded cases in
chronological order and identifyingJan. 13, 1972 as the date of registration of the first
case brought before ICSID).
38. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INvESTOR-STATE DisPurIvs ARISING FROM IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4.
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foreigners," weakness, or the product of corruption. Not only
do the politics of investor-State dispute settlement inhibit negoti-
ated settlements, they may actually encourage and prolong arbi-
tration since host government officials can shift blame for an un-
favorable result from itself to three foreign arbitrators.
This dynamic was apparently at work in the famous "Pyra-
mids Case," which pitted a group of foreign property developers
against the government of Egypt with respect to a proposed "des-
tination resort," one of which was to be constructed near the
Giza Pyramids. 39 The Egyptian government had initially ap-
proved the project but under public pressure ultimately can-
celled it. At one point in the history of this case, which contin-
ued over fifteen years, a tentative settlement of US$10 million
was negotiated.4 ° When the proposed settlement was presented
to the Prime Minister for his approval, he asked what the alterna-
tive was. Upon hearing that the alternative was for Egypt to con-
tinue to defend itself in arbitration, he found that option to be
preferable since an agreement to settle the case for US$10 mil-
lion would open him to attack by opponents and the media.41
In 1993, after making its way through the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") arbitration, the courts of
France, and ICSID arbitration (resulting in an award of US$27.6
million, plus US$5 million in costs, which was then challenged in
annulment proceeding), Egypt and the investors agreed to a ne-
gotiated settlement of US$17.5 million.42 This result might have
been avoided if, at an earlier stage, Egypt and the investor had
agreed to the intervention of a distinguished conciliator who
would have provided an expert opinion on a fair settlement of
the conflict, thereby giving the Prime Minister the political cover
that he felt he needed.
A similar political dynamic occurs within investor corpora-
tions. Individual corporate executives and their lawyers become
so committed to "winning" the investor-State dispute and so fear-
ful of appearing weak to their colleagues and competitors within
the organization that they resist flexibility in their approach to
39. See S. Pac. Properties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 45, 46
(1992).
40. Reported confidentially to the author by a participant in the negotiations.
41. Id.
42. See S.P.P. Settled; Annulment Proceedings Before ICSID Discontinued, 8 ME.&a.L-'s
INT'L ARB. REP., no.], 1993, at 1.
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the host government and reject offers of settlement that do not
meet their inflated expectations. In order to be effective, meth-
ods aimed at resolving investor-State disputes must accommo-
date the political considerations of both parties.
3. The Occurrence of Economic Crises
Domestic litigators know that economic recessions and cri-
ses provoke lawsuits as various claimants fight over their share of
a shrinking pie. The same phenomenon is at work in interna-
tional investment. Major financial crises often lead to disputes
that ultimately find their way to arbitration tribunals. The finan-
cial crises in Argentina, Asia, and Russia have all led to increased
recourse to arbitration. For example, of the approximately 200
registered cases at ICSID through March 2006, forty-one cases
involved Argentina as a respondent.43 Virtually all of these cases
have arisen as a result of the Argentine financial crisis at the be-
ginning of this century.
4. The Transformation of the Global Investment Climate
A more remote but nonetheless important cause for the in-
crease in investor-State disputes has been the transformation of
the global investment environment that has taken place during
the last twenty years. Beginning in the post World War II period,
virtually all developing countries rejected the liberal economic
model and believed that their governments had the primary re-
sponsibility for bringing about national economic development.
As a result, their systems were characterized by: (1) state plan-
ning and public ordering of their economies and societies; (2)
reliance on state enterprises as economic actors; (3) restriction
and regulation of the private sector; and (4) governmental limi-
tation and control of international economic transactions, espe-
cially foreign investment. Indeed, many countries had serious
reservations about the role of foreign direct investment in their
development and therefore adopted measures to control and
limit it. By the mid-1980s, this approach to development began
to lose its hold on the minds and actions of policy makers, aid
43. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 24 (listing 130 concluded cases
registered through March 2006, eleven of which involved Argentina as a respondent);
ICSID, List of Pending Cases, http://worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2007) (listing seventy-four pending cases registered through March 2006,
thirty of which involve Argentina as a respondent).
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agencies, and international financial institutions. Seeking to
transform themselves into "emerging markets," developing
countries increasingly privatized their state enterprises, engaged
in deregulation, opened their economies, instituted markets to
allocate resources, and began to aggressively encourage foreign
direct investment.
44
These efforts at foreign investment promotion took a variety
of forms including legislation to liberalize the economy, incen-
tives to attract foreign investors, road shows to capital-exporting
countries, public relations campaigns, and, of course, the con-
clusion of investment treaties with capital-exporting states.
Thus, within a short time, the position of foreign investors in
many countries was transformed from that of a dubious presence
at the sufferance of the host government to that of an eagerly
sought after and much courted guest. The result of this transfor-
mation may have led foreign investors to undertake their invest-
ments with high and perhaps unrealistic expectations about
their importance to the country and their status in it. Having
been eagerly courted by host governments, investors may have
come to believe that they were investing not at the sufferance of
the government but as of right. When the results of their invest-
ments did not accord with what they believed they had been
promised by the host government, their disappointment led
them to sue host governments in arbitration, rather than to
meekly accept any losses caused by host government actions.
5. Facilitating Factors
Investor-State arbitration was once a rare and arcane inter-
national process, the province of a few experts. That is no
longer the case. Indeed, the increase in investor-State arbitra-
tion has proved to be self-perpetuating. First, the growing num-
ber of cases and awards, some of which have been publicized in
the media, have led to an increased understanding of this dis-
pute settlement process and heightened ability to predict the re-
sults of future cases. Arbitral tribunals' elaboration of various
international legal principles affirming the protection of inves-
tor rights, as well as the award of substantial damages and their
subsequent payment by host governments, have proven useful to
44. SeeJeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Chang-
ing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAw. 875, 876-88 (1999).
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international investors and their lawyers as they decide whether
or not to invoke arbitration in individual disputes. Second, the
growth of law firms with expertise in this previously-arcane area
of the law has meant that investors have an important resource
to assist them in deciding whether or not to arbitrate and then
in actually carrying forward the arbitration. Having made sub-
stantial investments in developing investor-State arbitration ca-
pabilities, these law firms also have a strong incentive to en-
courage clients to choose this form of dispute settlement. Fi-
nally, in a relatively short time, tribunals and law firms have
refined the technology and processes of investor-State arbitra-
tion, thereby facilitating the handling of cases and perhaps, as a
result, encouraging other aggrieved investors to invoke this pro-
cess.
6. Lack of Other Satisfactory Dispute Resolution Remedies
An investor-State arbitration is a costly, risky, time-consum-
ing process that usually has the effect of destroying whatever bus-
iness relationships remain between the aggrieved investor and
the host country. One can assume, therefore, that a rational in-
vestor will not lightly resort to this dispute settlement process
and will examine other options for redress of its grievance
before doing so. The final and perhaps most important reason
for increased recourse to investor-State arbitration may be that
aggrieved investors, having undertaken that search for other op-
tions, have concluded that they have no more cost-effective, reli-
able remedy for the settlement of disputes than investor-State
arbitration. If, on the other hand, host countries and interna-
tional investors can find and develop effective alternatives to in-
ternational investor-State arbitration for the settlement of treaty-
based investment disputes, the costs of investment dispute settle-
ment for both states and investors may decline while working
relationships between investors and host governments may im-
prove. The remainder of this Article will seek to identify possi-
ble alternatives and suggest how they may be shaped to meet the
special needs of international investors and host governments.
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II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
A. Dispute Resolution Processes in General
To resolve a dispute, disputants can theoretically resort to
one of four basic dispute settlement processes. These four basic
processes, with numerous variations, include: (1) negotiation,
whereby the parties themselves through direct discussion of
their conflict agree to settle their dispute, a process that some-
times results in a renegotiation of their underlying transaction
or relationship; (2) mediation (often referred to as "concilia-
tion" in international business and investment disputes) or other
forms of voluntary third-party intervention, by which a non-dis-
putant third person assists the disputants to resolve their con-
flict;4 5 (3) arbitration, by which the parties to the dispute agree
to submit their dispute to a third person for a decision and to
abide by that decision; and (4) adjudication by a court of law or
some other governmental authority. As figure 1 indicates, these
four dispute resolution processes form a continuum from nego-
tiation on the one hand to adjudication on the other.
As the parties in conflict move along the continuum, they
increasingly lose control of their dispute and are increasingly
subject to the actions of a third party. In relying on negotiation
alone, the parties retain complete control over their dispute. In
mediation, they still maintain control over their dispute but the
very presence of a third person changes the dynamics between
them and can influence their actions. Arbitration requires an
agreement by the parties to submit to the process; however, once
a dispute is referred to arbitration, the arbitral panel controls
the dispute and has the power to impose a decision according to
the applicable law. In adjudication, the jurisdiction and proce-
dure of the courts is based on law rather than on the parties'
45. One scholar has defined mediation as:
[A] process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties'
own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assis-
tance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organiza-
tion to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.
Jacob Bercovitch, The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations, in ME-
DIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT 1, 7 Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992).
2007] ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 155
agreement, as is the case in arbitration.46
Figure 1
Negotiation Mediation Arbitration Adjudication
Disputants increasingly lose control.
Third party increasingly intrudes.
The four basic processes indicated above are not as distinct
from one another as the diagram might lead one to believe. Me-
diation is not a process separate from negotiation; rather, it is
the continuation of negotiation with the help of a third party. It
is part of the bargaining process. To a lesser but still important
extent, one can often interpret arbitration and litigation in many
cases as a continuation of negotiation by other means.
Lawyers and many executives tend to view arbitration and
adjudication as the principal ways of resolving international in-
vestment disputes. These two dispute settlement processes, how-
ever, suffer from several disadvantages. They are costly, time-
consuming, unpredictable, lack finality in some cases, and de-
stroy the business relationship between the disputants in nearly
all cases. Indeed, if the goal of the parties in a dispute is to pre-
serve their economic relationship (which usually requires a sig-
nificant investment of resources to create in the first place), they
should rely first and foremost on negotiation and mediation to
solve their problem. Arbitration and adjudication are primarily
means to liquidate an economic relationship. The end result of
both arbitration and adjudication is a decision as to whether or
not one of the parties is entitled to a sum of money in satisfac-
tion of its claim. Neither the aim nor the consequence of arbi-
tration is to repair a broken business relationship. Accordingly,
given the ever-present potential for conflict in international in-
vestments, the parties to international transactions, particularly
in long-term arrangements, should consider the role of negotia-
tion and mediation in resolving eventual disputes. Moreover,
46. SeeJESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR: MAKING, MANAGING, AND
MENDING DEALs AROUND THE WORLD IN THE TwE,-m-FiRsT CENTURY 225-27 (2003).
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they might even build these dispute settlement processes into
their transaction from the very beginning of their dealings to-
gether, before any conflict has arisen.
B. ADR
In the field of conflict studies, the expression Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") has become an established term of
art that designates various mechanisms whereby a third party,
not directly involved in the dispute, intervenes, with or without
an invitation, to assist the disputants to settle their conflict. It is
believed that the term ADR arose and gained currency in the
United States in the mid-1970s when its courts and legal schol-
ars, concerned about increasing judicial case loads, a "purported
litigation boom," and the questionable appropriateness of the
judicial process to certain types of disputes, began a search for
alternative processes of dispute resolution.4 7 In that context, the
meaning of "alternative dispute resolution" referred to dispute
resolution processes that were alternatives to the courts. As a
result, in the United States and elsewhere, there developed ADR
centers to facilitate or mediate disputes among citizens, ADR
practitioners to assist not only in purely private disputes but also
those involving the community and government agencies, and
ADR studies to further the theory and practice of this form of
dispute settlement.
Over time, the application of ADR techniques has become
common in a wide variety of settings, including disputes within
large organizations, conflicts between neighbors and family
members, public controversies over the construction of large in-
frastructure projects having negative effects on the environment
and the surrounding community, and even governmental rule
making.48 ADR has also been extended to the realm of interna-
tional political and ethnic disputes, though the courts are not a
realistic alternative for those kinds of disputes. The work of for-
47. CARRIEJ. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLV-
INC 624 (2006).
48. DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE Kim, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE
AND SETrLEMENT 228 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Bertram I. Spector, Negotiated Rulemaking: A
Participative Approach to Consensus-Building for Regulatoy Development and Implementation,
U.S. Agency for Int'l Development Implementing Policy Change Project, Technical
Note No. 10, May 1999, at 1, available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy_
andgovernance/publications/ipc/tn-10.pdf).
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mer U.S. Senator George Mitchell in mediating the conflict be-
tween Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,49 of former
President Jimmy Carter facilitating a settlement resulting in the
1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel,50 and of
the Norwegian foreign ministry in helping to broker a ceasefire
in Sri Lanka 5' are considered examples of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the international context.
While the term ADR may be relatively new in the English
lexicon, its underlying processes are as ancient as human society
itself. Third parties, acting as mediators, facilitators, or concilia-
tors and even arbitrators, have intervened in the disputes of
other persons since the dawn of civilization. What characterizes
this intervention is that the third party is assisting the disputants
to negotiate their dispute. Throughout the process, the dispu-
tants maintain control of their dispute and preserve their right
to agree to or refuse a proposed settlement or even to withdraw
entirely from the ADR process. For this reason, ADR is some-
times referred to as "facilitated negotiation," recognizing that
the role of the third party is to facilitate a negotiated settlement
of the parties' dispute. Methods of third-party intervention and
facilitation vary widely depending on the talents and resources of
the intervener, the nature of the dispute in question, and the
interests and needs of the disputants. In short, ADR does not
offer a single magic formula to settle all disputes.
In the domestic context, arbitration is often considered a
form of ADR since it is a dispute resolution process that stands as
an alternative to a court proceeding. In the international invest-
ment domain, however, where international adjudication has an
extremely limited scope and where arbitration under investment
treaties has become a standard form of dispute resolution, the
term "alternative dispute resolution" can refer to those dispute
resolution processes that stand as alternatives to both interna-
tional arbitration and adjudication in domestic courts. This Arti-
cle adopts that definition.
Proponents of ADR argue that it has significant advantages
over the courts. ADR, it is claimed, is quicker, less costly and
49. See generally GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (2001).
50. See DAVID W. LEASCH, 1979: THE YEAR THAT SHAPED THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST
4 (2001).
51. See Dr. S. Chandrasekharan, Sri Lanka: Cease-Fire Agreement and Prospects for
Peace, S. Asia Analysis Group, Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://www.saag.org.
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more effective at preserving or rebuilding relationships between
the parties than judicial decisions. A judicial decision, like an
arbitration award, is one-dimensional-an award of money dam-
ages or denial thereof-whereas settlements arrived at through
ADR are more likely to be multifaceted and take into account
the disputants' interests and needs. It is also argued that ADR
often results in agreements that are more optimal and stable
than arrangements made by the parties alone or decisions ren-
dered by an adjudicative body, such as a court or an arbitral tri-
bunal.
C. An Explanation For The Efficacy of ADR
Despite the popularity and apparent success of ADR in
many countries, one may well ask how the intervention of a third
person-a mediator or conciliator-enables parties to reach a
negotiated settlement when the parties, fully competent as they
are, are unable to do so. With respect to investor-State disputes,
the question is especially salient: What can a third person do to
facilitate a negotiated solution that a state and a multinational
corporation, with all their resources, cannot achieve by them-
selves? The question has practical as well as theoretical signifi-
cance. Unless the parties believe that a third person can truly
help to resolve their dispute, they are not likely to seek or accept
that person's assistance.
To answer the question, one must begin with a preliminary
inquiry: Why do negotiations fail? Scholars of negotiation con-
tend that negotiations fail because of the existence of "barriers
to agreement. '5 2 These barriers are of various types. Some arise
from the strategies and tactics of the parties, and may therefore
be called "strategic barriers," including the drive to achieve a
short-term gain, the refusal by the disputants to discuss their in-
terests or to reveal information needed to arrive at agreement
for fear they will be exploited by the other side, and the use of
threats and aggressive behavior to intimidate the other side.
Others fall into the category of "psychological barriers;" that is,
those that arise out of cognitive and motivational processes of
human beings, including the way they interpret information, ex-
perience feelings of gain or loss, evaluate risks, and deal with
52. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL.,
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 6 (lst ed. 1995).
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biases and emotions related to their dispute. Still other barriers
can be labeled as "structural" because they are based in the struc-
ture of the situation that confronts the disputants. For example,
the political limitations imposed upon negotiators, the bureau-
cratic obstacles to agreement in their respective organizations,
the existence of important constituencies seeking to obstruct any
agreement, and the political constraints felt by governments in-
volved in disputes.53
One can identify such barriers in investor-State investment
disputes. With respect to strategic and tactical barriers, the par-
ties may be reluctant to put forward proposals for a negotiated
agreement because they fear the other side will interpret that
action as "weakness" and therefore demand even more conces-
sions. A history of hostility between the investor's local manag-
ers and relevant host government officials may create a psycho-
logical barrier to a negotiated settlement. And, as noted above
with respect to the "Pyramids Case" in Egypt, the politics sur-
rounding the investor-State dispute and the existence of local
interest groups opposed to settlement may result in a structural
barrier that makes it difficult for government officials to agree to
settle the dispute with the investor. A further structural barrier
in investor-State disputes is that, while many government agen-
cies become involved in the dispute, no single agency is author-
ized to conduct negotiations on behalf of the government to
reach a settlement.54 As no two investor-State disputes are iden-
tical, no two investor-State disputes face the same barriers.
The basic task of the mediator who intervenes in the dispute
is to help the parties overcome the barriers to agreement. The
way in which a particular mediator accomplishes this task will
differ depending on the nature of the dispute, the history of the
relations between the parties, and the skills and resources of the
individual mediator. Just as no two disputes are alike, no two
mediators are alike in the way that they work. Mediators demon-
strate a great variation in the roles, approaches, procedures and
foci that they adopt.5 5 Some are more interventionist and direc-
53. See id. at 6-24.
54. See Barton Legum, The Difficulties of Conciliation in Investment Treaty Cases: A
Comment on Professor Jack C. Coe's Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-
State Disputes A Preliminary Sketch, 21 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., no.4, 2006, at 23.
55. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS 43-56 (2003).
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tive than others. In the field of labor mediation, for example,
one scholar has categorized mediators into two groups: "orches-
trators," who focus primarily on creating procedural and process
arrangements to facilitate a negotiated agreement, and "deal
makers," who concentrate on finding solutions to the substantive
issues that divide the parties.56
Beyond these theoretical considerations, one may well ask:
What is it that mediators actually do to facilitate a settlement of a
conflict between other persons? In general terms, a mediator
helps the parties resolve their conflict, which in most cases means
assisting them to negotiate a solution. A mediator, unlike an ar-
bitrator or a judge, has no power to impose a solution. At the
outset, one needs to recognize that a single, magic mediation
formula does not exist. Different mediators do different things.
In the international political domain, Jimmy Carter, George
Mitchell, and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, all successful
mediators, each used different techniques to mediate the dis-
putes they confronted. For one thing, mediators intrude into a
conflict to different degrees, depending on the nature of the dis-
pute, the parties, and their own skills, resources, and judgment.
In general terms, there are three basic areas that mediators seek
to address in their efforts to facilitate a negotiated agreement
between the parties: a) process, b) communications, and c) sub-
stance.
1. Process
At the most basic level, a mediator may simply work to shape
a more productive process of interaction between the parties in
the dispute. For example, parties to a dispute may be unwilling
to talk to one another or even to suggest a meeting for fear that
such action would be interpreted as weakness. On the other
hand, they may be willing to meet if the meeting is proposed,
organized, and conducted by a mediator who has their respect.
The site where mediation takes place can have an impact on the
conflict dynamic, so the mediator's choice of a meeting site is an
important decision. The site's neutrality, privacy, and security
may be conducive to a settlement. It is for this reason that Camp
David, the retreat of U.S. presidents, has been a favored site for
conflict mediation.
56. See DEBORAH KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 41-43 (1983).
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One process technique that many mediators use is to caucus
individually with the disputants in order to learn of their under-
lying interests and concerns. In a one-on-one session with the
mediator, disputants may be more frank about their interests
and concerns and less confrontational and emotional, thereby
giving the mediator insights into how best to resolve the conflict.
Some research suggests that when hostility between the parties is
high, bringing them together too soon may serve to exacerbate
the conflict, rather than begin a process toward resolution.57 In
these preliminary meetings, mediators often try to develop and
achieve agreement on some basic ground rules for the dispu-
tants to employ in conducting their discussions together.
Mediators also work to increase the parties' motivation to solve
their problem themselves. They do this by talking optimistically
about the possibilities for resolution, by using their relationship
with each disputant to encourage them to work sincerely to find
a solution, and by seeking ways to build trust between them.
2. Communications
Merely creating a better process may not be enough to settle
the dispute. Mediators also try to find ways to improve communi-
cations between contending parties. For example, mediators
often help the two sides understand and acknowledge the legiti-
macy of each other's interests and needs and to avoid the use of
inflammatory, emotional language in their communications with
each other. One important way by which a mediator can im-
prove communications between the parties is to help them de-
fine the precise issues in dispute and to help them stay focused
on those issues during the discussion. A conflict is often exacer-
bated by parties' misperceptions of each other and distortions
caused by hostility. By defining the issues, the mediator can
move the parties toward active problem solving and away from
personal recriminations. More than merely defining the issues,
the mediator can facilitate settlement by reframing the issues in
a way that appeals to the interests of both parties.
In addition to reframing issues, another mediation tech-
nique is to sequence issues; that is, to develop an agreed-upon
agenda as to the order in which the parties will address the issues
in dispute. Sometimes a mediator can create momentum toward
57. See PRUrTT & KIM, supra note 48, at 229.
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a solution and build confidence between the parties by taking up
and resolving the easier issues before addressing the more diffi-
cult ones.
3. Substance
Finally, when the disputants remain locked in their posi-
tions, mediators offer substantive suggestions as to how the two
parties might solve their problem. In working on the substance
of the problem, mediators often use a variety of techniques and
resources to validate the merit of their ideas, to deflate the par-
ties' expectations and indicate the weaknesses in the parties' po-
sitions. A mediator's effectiveness in this regard will often de-
pend on his or her reputation, expertise, relationships with the
parties, and base of experience.
D. The Potential Application Of ADR To
Treaty-Based Investor-State Disputes
For some governments and observers, the growth in the
number of treaty-based, investor-State arbitrations is a new form
of "litigation explosion," comparable to the litigation "boom" ex-
perienced in the United States, a situation that has provoked a
search for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In the
case of international investment disputes, the search is not for an
alternative to the courts but to treaty-based international arbitra-
tion.
An initial inquiry in the search for alternatives to investor-
State arbitration is to ask: What are the existing alternatives to
investor-State arbitration to which an aggrieved investor may
have recourse in its dispute with a host government? Aside from
international arbitration, an investor aggrieved by the actions or
inaction of a host government has four options: (1) recourse to
the courts or other judicial institutions of the host country; (2)
acceptance of governmental action by absorbing or off-setting
the costs of alleged wrongful governmental action or inaction;
(3) direct negotiation of a settlement of the dispute with the
host government; or (4) mediation, conciliation, or other non-
binding dispute resolution methods involving the help of a third
party. Each of these processes is evaluated from the point of
view of the investor, since it is the aggrieved investor who
chooses among alternatives in selecting a particular dispute set-
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dement mechanism. Normally, the investor will make that
choice by weighing and comparing the potential costs and bene-
fits offered by each alternative.
1. Local Courts
A first alternative to investor-State arbitration for aggrieved
investors is recourse to the courts of the host country. Depend-
ing on the country involved, this option, which some investment
treaties require as a step preliminary to arbitration, may pose a
variety of problems for foreign investors. First, depending on
the country concerned, local courts may suffer from a lack of
judicial independence and be subject to the political control of
the host government, thus depriving the investor of a neutral
forum. Second, even if the judiciary is independent, it may
nonetheless harbor prejudice toward foreign investors, as the
courts of the state of Mississippi demonstrated in the ICSID case
of Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States.58 Third, many local courts
may not have the expertise to apply complex principles of inter-
national law to complicated foreign investment transactions.
Fourth, even if judges have such expertise, domestic law may
prohibit local courts from adjudicating on their state's interna-
tional commitments and therefore deny them jurisdiction over
treaty claims made by investors. And finally, local courts often
strain under a heavy backlog of cases and inefficient procedures
that deny expeditious justice and make the prospect of any final
judicial determination of a dispute illusory. For these reasons,
investors do not generally consider local courts an effective alter-
native to international arbitration of their disputes, and they
therefore seek to avoid them. Indeed, one of the principal rea-
sons for creating the investor-State arbitration system was to en-
able investors to avoid the courts of the countries in which they
had invested.
On the other hand, the degree to which these factors are
present varies from country to country. To the extent that ef-
forts at judicial reform and capacity-building succeed in particu-
lar countries, the attractiveness of local courts as an alternative
to international arbitration for the resolution of investor-State
disputes may increase in those countries.
58. 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 421, 451-53, 468-69 (2003).
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2. Acceptance And Internal Adjustment
Not all alleged violations of investment treaties result in liti-
gation or arbitration. Depending on the costs of alleged wrong-
ful governmental action, an investor may merely decide to ab-
sorb or find ways of off-setting the costs of that action. The in-
vestor makes that decision essentially on the basis of an
evaluation of the costs and benefits of other actions in compari-
son to acceptance. In making that calculation, the investor will
often evaluate the long-term benefits of continuing productive
relations with the host country government and the local busi-
ness community against the costs to be incurred by taking some
other action. The decision will also be influenced by the inves-
tor's ability to absorb the additional.costs or to shift those costs
to other persons. In short, while a government action may pro-
voke a conflict (i.e. a perceived divergence of interests) with the
investor, the investor may choose not to convert its conflict into
a dispute by activating it.
On the other hand, while host governments always assume
that the investor can and should take this acceptance option,
there are powerful forces driving against it. The shareholders,
creditors, financing institutions and other stakeholders of corpo-
rate investors expect corporate management to maximize profits
for the corporation so as to benefit those stakeholders. If, as a
result of a governmental action violating an investment treaty, a
corporate investor has a substantial claim under international
law against the host country, corporate management may have
an obligation to pursue that claim vigorously. In the abstract,
the failure to do so may be viewed under the law applicable to
the corporation or its contract with stakeholders as a violation by
management or the board of directors of their legal duties to
shareholders and other stakeholders. A substantial claim under
international law against a host state is a corporate asset, and the
investor therefore may have a legal obligation not to abandon it,
particularly if that claim has a material impact on the operations
of the investor. In evaluating the worth of that claim, corporate
management will usually rely on the advice of their internal legal
counsel, who in turn consults and is influenced by the com-
pany's external litigation law firm. Depending on its personnel
and experience, that law firm may have a predisposition to liti-
gate to resolve disputes and that predisposition may lead it to
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recommend the initiation of arbitration. Moreover, some ob-
servers also contend that, since law firms have a financial interest
in litigating claims on behalf of their corporate clients, their
evaluation of potential success in arbitration may be strongly in-
fluenced by their self-interest in earning litigation fees.59
A further argument against doing nothing in the face of an
alleged investment treaty violation is that it may encourage other
violations in the future. If an investor does nothing in response
to a host country violation, it may consider itself to be more vul-
nerable to other violations in the future by the host state in ques-
tion or other host states where it has other investments. If the
investment treaty is truly to serve as a discipline on host govern-
ment behavior, individual investors must be willing to challenge
that behavior by invoking the treaty's provisions.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that any sys-
tem of litigation entails the risk of frivolous lawsuits, and inves-
tor-State arbitrations are no exception. Investors may bring
baseless arbitrations either because they honestly have misevalu-
ated the strength of their claims, because they view the arbitra-
tion as a means to pressure a negotiated settlement from the
host state, or because they believe they have relatively little to
lose and the potential to gain a great deal. One way for arbitra-
tors to dissuade such frivolous cases is to allocate all or a substan-
tial portion of the arbitration costs to such claimants if they lose
their case.
3. Negotiation
Many disputes between foreign investors and host countries
are resolved through negotiation. Indeed, nearly all investment
treaties provide that in the event of a dispute between an inves-
tor and the host country the two parties are to engage in consul-
tations and negotiations, often for a specified period of time (six
59. Scholar and arbitrator Thomas W. Walde strongly insists on this point:
Essentially, managers when faced with disputes often give up and just pass
them on to corporate lawyers who pass them on to specialised international
law firms who pass them on to the very narrow club of international arbitra-
tors. The sense of business, of commercial efficiency, of proactive rather than
reactive assault on managerial challenges, gets lost on the way: managers sim-
ply give up. The lawyers run away with such disputes into their own playing
fields.
Thomas W. Wdlde, Efficient Management of Transnational Disputes: Mutual Gain by Media-
tion or Joint Loss in Litigation, 22 ARB. INT'L 205, 206 (2006).
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months in many cases), before the investor may seek other reme-
dies. As a result, it is safe to say that virtually all such disputes go
through a period of negotiation before reaching settlement or
advancing to the stage of formal investor-State arbitration. Be-
cause of the confidentiality usually surrounding such settle-
ments, accurate, comprehensive statistics on negotiated settle-
ments of investor-state conflicts are not available. Still, one
would suppose that over the last eighteen years, such settlements
vastly outnumber the estimated 229 investor-State arbitrations
that have been lodged.
Negotiations may be conducted before or after the investor
has begun arbitration. For example, in 2006 an ICSID case
brought by the Western NIS Enterprise Fund (the "Fund")
against Ukraine6 ° was terminated when the two disputants
agreed to a settlement whereby the Fund was reimbursed by
Ukraine for certain loans that it had made." It is estimated that
thirty percent of all cases registered at ICSID are settled through
negotiations, rather than by a binding award of an arbitral tribu-
nal.6 2 Approximately two-thirds of all arbitration cases filed with
the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration
are settled by negotiation before an arbitral award is made.6"
Since direct, unassisted investor-State negotiation is an alter-
native to investor-State arbitration, policy makers need to seek
ways to make this alternative more attractive to investors and
more efficient for arriving at settlements that are satisfactory to
the parties. A first step in this direction would be for govern-
ments to designate and authorize a specific government agency
to have responsibility for managing investor-State disputes when
they arise and for negotiating settlements of such conflicts. A
second step involves the central government's coordination with
sub-national units of states. Many investor-State disputes arise,
not because of actions taken against investor interests by central
governments, but because of actions taken by various sub-na-
60. W. NIS Enter. Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/2 (Jan. 26,
2004).
61. See Luke Eric Peterson, Ukraine Reaches Settlement in BIT Claim by US-Gov't Ven-
ture Capital Fund, INV. TcA-v NEWS, July 4, 2006, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2006/im july4_2006.pdf.
62. See Coe, supra note 29, at 35.
63. See Eric Schwartz, International Conciliation and the ICC, 10 ICSID REv. - FOREIGN
INv. L.J. 98, 99 (1995).
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tional officials and agencies such as governors, state assemblies,
and town councils. In many cases, such actions are taken by lo-
cal officials without any knowledge of applicable treaties and the
rights they confer on investors. Moreover, such local officials
and agencies may exacerbate resulting conflicts and take actions
that tend to politicize them. This suggests that one possible ave-
nue of reducing the likelihood of investor-State disputes is to
better inform such local officials of the state's treaty obligations
and their impact on sub-national units and to develop better
means of detecting the development of conflicts so that the cen-
tral government might be able to play a role in settling them at
an early stage.
In the long run, an improvement in the use of negotiation
as an alternative dispute settlement process requires a better un-
derstanding of how investor-State negotiations take place. Al-
though it is difficult to generalize in the absence of systematic
evidence, individual cases highlight factors that can contribute
to the success or failure of a negotiation. For example, in 1993,
Enron, a U.S. corporation, and the Maharashtra State Electricity
Board ("MSEB") in India signed a contract whereby a consor-
tium led by Enron would build the Dabhol Power Project, a
US$2 billion investment. The MSEB signed an agreement to buy
all the electricity produced by the Project over the following
twenty years. When a new government came to power in
Maharashtra as a result of elections, it cancelled the contract,
alleging that the power tariff was too high and that the contract
was not in the State of Maharashtra's best interests. Negotiations
between the State of Maharashtra and Enron succeeded, result-
ing in modification of the contract, a reduction in power tariffs,
and the continuation of the project. One factor that led to this
result was that Enron's business strategy in India at the time con-
templated undertaking numerous energy projects throughout
India in the years to come. Enron judged those potential future
investment relationships to be worth more than winning an arbi-
tration award in a case that would certainly be a protracted strug-
gle and that might ultimately destroy its opportunities to under-
take other power projects in the country. It therefore constantly
remained open to a negotiated settlement throughout its con-
flict with the State of Maharashtra.
Maharashtra's subsequent reevaluation of its own interests
also led it to become more open to a negotiated settlement.
168 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:138
When the Maharashtra government cancelled the electricity sup-
ply agreement, it assumed that its action would entail relatively
little cost. It also assumed that other investors would be willing
to step into the shoes vacated by Enron or that the State would
be able to find indigenous solutions to its power shortage. Once
those assumptions proved false and once Enron had begun an
arbitration case in London with a claim of US$300 million, the
State of Maharashtra became considerably more open to renego-
tiation than it was at the time it cancelled the contract.64 Thus, it
appears that at least in some cases, the existence of an investor-
State arbitration remedy for the investor may encourage dispu-
tant flexibility and create an incentive for host governments to
negotiate a settlement. It may well be, when examining the to-
tality of investor-State negotiations, that the prospect of investor-
State arbitrations is a factor inducing negotiated settlements of
investor-State disputes.
The initiation of an arbitration may both favor and discour-
age negotiated settlements, depending on the circumstances.
On the one hand, faced with the hard realities of the costs, slow
pace, and unpredictability of arbitration, some parties may be
encouraged to negotiate a settlement of their dispute rather
than to incur more expense and delay. On the other hand, the
initiation of arbitration may itself create a psychological barrier
to settlement because it causes the parties to harden their posi-
tion and reject flexibility in their approach to one another.
A variety of factors can prevent the achievement of a negoti-
ated settlement. The host government's belief that vital national
interests are at stake, the investor's perception that its crucial
economic interests are in play, the political dynamics of the host
country, the inability of the investor to mitigate its loss by other
means, and the appointment by the parties of incompetent or
dysfunctional negotiators to represent them are just some of the
factors that can inhibit or halt the negotiation process.
Unrealistic expectations of the parties are a further obstacle
to successful negotiations. The alternative to a successful negoti-
ation in most cases is arbitration in which the investor will be the
claimant and the state refusing that claim the respondent. Inter-
national investor-State arbitration has risks and costs for both
sides, and it is important that both sides understand them thor-
64. See SALACUSE, supra note 46, at 236-47.
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oughly as they approach the negotiation process so they can ac-
curately evaluate the worth of a settlement proposal advanced by
the other side. Not surprisingly, parties to a dispute, influenced
by psychological and political factors, tend to view their conflict
from their own points of view, leading them to overestimate
their chances of success in any eventual litigation. When the in-
vestor overvalues the strength of its treaty claim and the host
state undervalues the worth of the claimant's case, opportunities
for a successful negotiated settlement decline. Various factors
may lead to this miscalculation, including the failure of their law-
yers to give their clients a realistic and brutally frank assessment
of the strength of their respective cases and the likelihood of
prevailing in arbitration. One possible means of overcoming
these various barriers to a negotiated settlement is through the
intervention into the dispute of a skillful, well-intentioned third
party who can provide the disputants with a neutral, disinter-
ested evaluation of their respective cases.
4. Mediation, Conciliation, And Other Forms Of
Voluntary Third-Party Intervention
In theory and in law, there is no reason why mediation and
other forms of ADR, as previously described, could not be ap-
plied to resolve investor-State disputes just as they are success-
fully applied in a wide variety of other contexts. Certainly, noth-
ing in any international investment treaty prohibits recourse by
the parties to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
processes to settle potential treaty claims. On the other hand,
few investment treaties specifically authorize or recognize the ap-
plicability of ADR to investor-State disputes. Those that do only
tend to make reference to conciliation, which is a form of ADR
but does not necessarily encompass the range of techniques and
approaches traditionally associated with ADR.
With respect to non-adjudicative methods for the resolution
of investor-State disputes, the traditional formulation found in
many, if not most, investment treaties is that in the event of an
investor-State dispute, "the parties to the dispute shall initially
seek to resolve the dispute by consultations and negotiations,"6"
65. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Austl.-Vietnam, art. 12(1), Mar. 5 1991, Austl. T.S. No. 36, available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/australia-vienam.pdf.
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"the dispute shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through
negotiations between the parties," " or "the dispute shall ... as
much as possible be settled amicably between the parties.
67
Although these treaty provisions requiring the parties to en-
gage in negotiations and consultations before initiating arbitra-
tion do not specify how those negotiations and consultations are
to be conducted, they certainly do not prevent the parties from
seeking the assistance of third parties such as mediators, concili-
ators, or facilitators, to help them in their negotiations and con-
sultations. On the other hand, specific language encouraging or
authorizing the use of ADR might serve as an important signal to
both governments and investors that the states in question in-
tended to encourage disputants to have recourse to ADR and
that they should approach the resolution of their dispute accord-
ingly. Although no supporting evidence exists, it is possible that
a treaty's failure to authorize ADR has inhibited disputants from
using it in individual cases.
Some treaties specifically authorize the use of conciliation,
which is the only form of non-binding third party procedure that
they recognize. For example, the Japan-P.R.C. BIT (1988) gives
the investor the option of resorting either to conciliation or arbi-
tration.68 However, no treaty requires its use.
Other treaties contain specific language expressly authoriz-
ing the use of alternative resolution techniques as part of the
negotiation and consultation process. For instance, the United
States-Poland BIT (1990) states: "In the event of an investment
dispute ... the parties to the dispute shall initially seek to resolve
the dispute by consultation and negotiation, which may include
66. Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 13(1), Nov. 21, 1985, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/glb/2777/2778/t16194.htm.
67. "Tout differend relatif aux investissements entre l'une des Parties con-
tractantes et un national ou une socit4 de l'autre Partie contractante est autant que
possible rdgl a l'amiable entre les deux Parties concernes." L'accord entre le
Gouvernement de la Republique Franiaise et le Gouvernement de la Republique de
Panama sur le traitement et la protection des investissements, Fr.-Pan., art. 8, 1, Nov.
5, 1982, Journal Official de la Republique Francaise JO.] [Official Gazette of France],
October 17, 1985, p. 12067.
68. Agreement Between the People's Republic of China andJapan Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Japan-P.R.C., art. 11 (2), Aug.
27, 1988, 1555 U.N.T.S. 238.
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the use of non-binding, third-party procedures."6 9 Article 6(2)
of the United States-Turkey BIT (1985) provides that if negotia-
tions are unsuccessful, "the dispute may be settled through the
use of non-binding, third party procedures upon which [the par-
ties] mutually agree. '7' And Article 23 of the United States
Model BIT (2004) also provides: "In the event of an investment
dispute, the claimant and the respondent shall initially seek to
resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which
may include the use of non-binding, third party procedures."'"
This language appears to represent an attempt by states to un-
derscore the importance of alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques and to introduce them into the investor-State dispute res-
olution process.
It is difficult to determine exactly the extent to which such
third-party intervention actually takes place in investor-State dis-
putes. It may well be that third parties such as local business
leaders, diplomats, politicians and others, play a role in facilitat-
ing the investor-State disputes that are successfully settled
through negotiation. While these third parties may not be desig-
nated formally as mediators, they may nevertheless exercise me-
diation functions.
The willingness of disputants to resort to mediation or other
ADR techniques depends among other factors on their knowl-
edge of and experience with these processes.
Traditionally, companies engaged in an international
business dispute have not actively sought the help of
mediators. They have first tried to resolve the matter them-
selves through negotiation, but when theyjudged that to have
failed, they have immediately proceeded to arbitration. Vari-
ous factors explain their failure to try mediation: their lack of
knowledge about mediation and the availability of mediation
services, the fact that companies tend to give control of their
disputes to lawyers whose professional inclination is to liti-
gate, and the belief that mediation is merely a stalling tactic
that only delays the inevitability of an arbitration proceed-
69. Treaty Concerning Business and Economic Relations, U.S.-Pol., art. 9(2), Mar.
21, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-18 (1990).
70. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, U.S.-Turk., art. 6(2), Dec. 3, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-19 (1986).
71. US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 23 (2004), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/38602.htm.
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With increasing recognition of the disadvantages of arbitra-
tion, some companies are beginning to turn to more explicit
forms of mediation to resolve business disputes.73 Increasingly,
when a dispute can be quantified (for example the extent of
damage to an asset by a partner's action or the amount of a roy-
alty fee owed to a licensor), the parties will engage an indepen-
dent third party such as an international accounting or consult-
ing firm to examine the matter and give an opinion. The opin-
ion is not binding on the parties but it has the effect of allowing
them to make a more realistic prediction of what may happen in
an arbitration proceeding.
Host countries' lack of experience with and detailed knowl-
edge of ADR in its application to investor-State disputes may also
explain why they have not resorted to these means more often.
The politics of investor-State disputes may also be a complicating
factor in this regard since resorting to ADR might be viewed as
weakness or as compromising national interests, particularly
once the investor has initiated international arbitration. Specific
authorization in an investment treaty to use ADR techniques
might counter this reaction to some extent.
One type of voluntary third-party intervention that has par-
ticular relevance for investor-State conflicts is conciliation. Many
arbitration institutions, such as ICSID and the International
Chamber of Commerce, offer a service known as conciliation,
which is normally governed by a set of rules. 4 Indeed, certain
investment treaties specially provide for conciliation as an option
in investor-State disputes. Generally, in institutional concilia-
tion, a party to a dispute addresses a request for conciliation to
the institution offering conciliation services. If the institution
concerned secures the agreement of the other disputant, it will
appoint a conciliator. While the conciliator has broad discretion
72. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Mediation in International Business, in STUDIES IN INrERNA-
TIONAL MEDIATION 213, 222 (2002).
73. For example, General Electric Corporation has developed a program known as
the Early Dispute Resolution Initiative that seeks to save money and time through the
effective use of dispute resolution techniques outside of formal litigation and arbitra-
tion, often with external mediators. See Michael 'Wheeler & Gillian Morris, GE's Early
Dispute Resolution Initiative (A), Harvard Business School Case No. 9-801-395 (2001).
74. See, e.g., ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings, in ICSID CONVEN-
TION, REGULATIONS AND RULES (2006), available at http://wv.worldbank.org/icsid/
basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
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to conduct the process, in practice he or she will invite both
sides to state their views of the dispute and will then make a re-
port proposing an appropriate settlement. The parties may re-
ject the report and proceed to arbitration, or they may accept it.
In many cases, they will use it as a basis for a negotiated settle-
ment.
Conciliation is thus a kind of non-binding arbitration.75 Its
function is predictive. It tends to be rights-based in its approach,
affording the parties a third person's evaluation of their respec-
tive rights and obligations. If, as indicated above, mediators
work on process, communications, and substance of disputes,
conciliators focus almost exclusively on the substance of the dis-
pute. They do not usually adopt a problem-solving or relation-
ship-building approach to resolving the dispute between the par-
ties, nor do they seek to eliminate the various psychological, stra-
tegic, and structural barriers that obstruct negotiations. The
conciliation process is confidential and completely voluntary. Ei-
ther party may withdraw from conciliation at any time.
One theoretical question that is sometimes raised is how to
categorize conciliation. It has been argued that it is a process
separate and distinct from mediation; however, if one defines
mediation as a voluntary process by which a third person assists
the disputants to negotiate a settlement of their dispute, then
conciliation clearly falls within the category of mediation. 76 Con-
ciliation as it is currently practiced would appear to be a form of
mediation, albeit narrower in scope: Its primary focus is to pro-
pose a solution that the parties may use as a basis of a negotiated
settlement rather than to work on process and communications
and seek to eliminate the various other barriers to agreement.
The conciliator has no power to impose a decision. The primary
function of the conciliator's report is to help the parties negoti-
ate a settlement.
Since conciliation is confidential, public information on the
process itself is scant. One of the few published accounts con-
cerns the first conciliation conducted under ICSID auspices in
which a retired English judge, Lord Wilberforce, successfully ac-
ted as a conciliator to help resolve a dispute involving the distri-
75. See Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
The ICSJD Experience, 22 NEws FROM ICSID 12-14 (2005).
76. See Coe, supra note 29, at 14.
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bution of US$143 million in profits between Tesoro Petroleum
Corporation and the State of Trinidad and Tobago. The concili-
ation, which started in 1984, took less than two years and cost a
mere US$11,000." Despite the success of ICSID's first concilia-
tion and despite the reference to conciliation in some invest-
ment treaties, this form of dispute settlement has not become
widely used to resolve investor-State disputes. For example, by
2006, ICSID had received 196 requests for arbitration since its
creation and only five requests for conciliation.78 Similarly, from
1988 to 1993, a period in which over 2,000 arbitration cases were
filed at the International Chamber of Commerce, it received
only fifty-four requests for conciliation. Of that number, the
other party in the dispute agreed to conciliation in only sixteen
cases; however, the ICC appointed only ten conciliators, since
the parties in six cases settled their dispute or withdrew their
request. Of the ten conciliations, nine had been completed by
1994, with five resulting in complete settlement.79 These figures
do not mean that mediation is not frequently used in settling
international business and investment disputes. It is quite possi-
ble that third parties, other than formally designated
"mediators," "conciliators," or "facilitators" have played a role in
helping the parties in investment disputes negotiate a settle-
ment.
In considering the applicability of ADR to investor-State dis-
putes, it must be stressed that conciliation as it is currently prac-
ticed and generally conceived of by many lawyers is only one
rather limited form of mediation. In contrast to the rather pas-
sive and restricted role played by Lord Wilberforce in ICSID's
first conciliation case is the very different approach adopted by a
multidisciplinary team of mediators in successfully mediating an
investment dispute between Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned
electricity company, and Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne
("PSE"), a Polish integrated electricity company.8" In the mid-
77. Lester Nurick & StephenJ. Schnably, The First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petro-
leum Corporation v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 ICSID REv. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 343-48
(1986).
78. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 24; ICSID, List of Pending Cases,
supra note 43 (listing all concluded and pending ICSID cases and distinguishing be-
tween arbitration and conciliation cases within the case numbers).
79. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 107.
80. See Walde, supra note 59, at 218-31 (discussing the conciliation case between
Vattenfall and Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne).
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1990s, Vattenfall, seeking to develop an export market for its
electricity, and PSE, fearing a future scarcity of electricity, en-
tered into a twenty-year contract whereby Vattenfall would build
and finance a US$300 million undersea interconnector linking
the two countries. PSE committed itself to purchase Vattenfall's
electricity at fixed mid-1990s prices for a period of twenty years.
By the turn of the century, the energy environment of the
two companies and their respective countries had changed dra-
matically. PSE now had an oversupply of electricity and electric-
ity prices in Poland had dropped considerably from what they
had been in the mid-1990s. As a result, PSE's long-term commit-
ment to purchase Vattenfall's electricity became financially oner-
ous. It therefore began negotiations with Vattenfall to reduce its
price obligations and also to gain the right to sell its electricity to
Sweden, using the undersea interconnector. When these negoti-
ations failed, PSE refused to take and pay for Vattenfall's elec-
tricity under the contract, and Vattenfall, in response,
threatened to take their dispute to international arbitration.
Rather than turn the dispute over to the two companies'
litigators, the negotiators for the two sides decided to seek the
help of a mediator in hopes of arriving at a negotiated settle-
ment. Using a tender process, it secured the assistance of a me-
diation team consisting of a chief mediator and a few technical
experts. Instead of merely hearing the legal arguments made by
each side, the mediator actively worked to identify and eliminate
the various barriers (the chief mediator referred to them as
"blockages") that had to that point obstructed negotiations.
Moreover, he also sought to find ways to improve three essential
aspects of their negotiations: process, communications, and sub-
stance. Over a period of seventy-five days, which first involved
intense individual consultations with the parties (a form of shut-
tle diplomacy between Stockholm and Warsaw) and then joint
mediation meetings with the company's negotiators, the media-
tor was able to create a process that ultimately led to creative
problem solving. The mediator understood that the dispute was
not purely legal and technical. Various psychological and emo-
tional factors on both sides had to be dealt with to create a "posi-
tive current" favoring a settlement. In addition, the mediator
had to consult and mobilize various outside forces, such as Euro-
pean Commission officials and country regulators, so that they
might contribute to a successful settlement of the dispute. In
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the end, mediation enabled the two companies to negotiate,
over an additional 100 days, a new contractual regime for the
interconnector that allowed both sides to generate new reve-
nues. The two companies thus achieved a win-win solution that
created value for both and allowed them to avoid the costs and
uncertainties of an international arbitration.
III. A CONSIDERATION OF THE ADVANTAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES OF ADR IN
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
While mediation is not likely to replace arbitration and ne-
gotiation as basic means for settling investor-State disputes, its
enhanced use as an additional dispute settlement process would
seem to offer advantages to both investors and states. First, suc-
cessful mediations are usually cheaper and less time-consuming
than arbitrations. As indicated above, the average investor-State
arbitration often extends over several years and consumes mil-
lions of dollars in litigation costs alone. For example, had Vat-
tenfall and PSE gone to arbitration the two companies would
easily have spent US$5 million in litigation costs alone. 1
Second, a successful mediation is more often likely to pre-
serve working relations between the investor and the host gov-
ernment and be less disruptive of the underlying investment en-
terprise, avoiding the negative effect on the lives of people in the
host country that may accompany such disruptions. In some
cases, as in the Vattenfall-PSE dispute, mediation creates new
value and allows the parties to derive revenues that would never
have been possible as the result of arbitration. Whereas an arbi-
tration award is a one-dimensional solution to a problem involv-
ing the granting or denial of money, a mediated solution to a
conflict is often multidimensional and seeks to take account of
the interests of both sides so as to arrive at a win-win solution.
For example, if a host government has restricted the use of or
seized land owned by the investor for reasons of public interest
or public health, an arbitration would determine whether or not
an illegal expropriation had taken place and, if so, how much
the investor is to be compensated. A mediated solution to the
81. See id. at 232 ("In the Vattenfall-PSE dispute, arbitration would probably have
meant significant costs (say US$5m), but moreover the loss of profit which might by
now have amounted to several hundreds of million of Euros, shared by both parties.").
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same problem might involve a complex arrangement whereby
the government provides other land for the investor's use, the
investor agrees to change its manner of using the land to meet
government regulations, and the government modifies certain
regulations. It is possible that such a mediated solution would
allow the host state to meet its public interest concerns and for
the investor to derive profits, while continuing to employ local
citizens and pay local taxes.
An additional advantage of mediation over arbitration is the
confidentiality of the proceedings and the outcome. Parties in-
volved in arbitration run the risk of an arbitral decision that may
stand as an unsatisfactory precedent in future cases concerning
challenges by other investors to the same governmental actions
or regulations contested in the arbitration in question. While
arbitral decisions do not have the effect of legal precedent, they
are nevertheless cited by lawyers in arguing cases and are con-
sulted by arbitrators in making their decision. Mediations, on
the other hand, do not create such precedents since they are
confidential. Moreover, a litigated dispute over many years with
a major investor can have negative consequences for interna-
tional perceptions of the investment climate in the host country
and can negatively affect the business reputation and relation-
ships of the investor. Finally, a negotiated solution worked out
under the auspices of a mediator with a distinguished reputation
can reduce some of the political onus and risk on both govern-
ment officials and investors in agreeing to a settlement of a dis-
pute that may have political overtones and attract media atten-
tion.
Despite these potential advantages, mediation of investor-
State disputes has been little used. The precise reasons that dis-
putants have rarely resorted to conciliation or other forms of
mediation in their disputes with host countries are not clear, but
this is certainly a subject of study that institutions such as ICSID,
the ICC, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment ("UNCTAD"), and other organizations concerned about
the increase in investor-State arbitration should address. None-
theless, one can speculate on various reasons for this disinclina-
tion to mediate.
First, because mediation is little used in investor-State dis-
putes, government officials, corporate executives, and lawyers
are not often deeply knowledgeable about this process and how
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they can initiate it. Since they are unfamiliar with mediation,
they are not likely to employ it in resolving disputes.
Second, even if they are familiar with the process in theory,
they may not know how to find persons who have the requisite
experience and skills to mediate an investor-State dispute. While
it is true that ICSID and other institutions have established lists
of conciliators, it is unclear that such persons, despite their gen-
eral professional standing, are suited to mediate particular in-
vestment disputes. An effective mediator needs much more than
knowledge of international law. He or she must have the skills
to understand and deal with a wide variety of emotional, psycho-
logical, organizational, political, and process issues that obstruct
understanding between the parties. Indeed, the resources and
experience of a deal-making investment banker are probably
much more germane to the mediation of an investor-State dis-
pute than are the talents of a litigator. In any event, the tender
process used in the Vattenfall-PSE case is worthy of considera-
tion as a way to find a mediator.
Third, in the case of governments, officials may feel that le-
gally or politically they may not have resort to ADR techniques in
handling a dispute with an investor. Since no law or regulation
specifically authorizes the use of ADR methods, such officials
may be reluctant to take a course of action that will later be chal-
lenged by higher authority or particular groups within the coun-
try. Lack of a specific budget allocation to pay for ADR services
may also be a constraint.
A fourth reason for the lack of recourse to mediation is the
perception, particularly among lawyers, that it is not effective in
settling disputes, that states will use it as a delaying tactic,
thereby merely adding to the time and expense of an inevitable
arbitration. Lawyers who make this argument may be driven by
professional disposition or self-interest rather than by a mea-
sured and scientific evaluation of mediation itself.
Fifth, in the case of investment disputes that have political
overtones and have attracted significant media and popular at-
tention, government officials are reluctant to agree to a medi-
ated settlement reached in confidential circumstances for fear of
being accused of weakness in defending national interests
against foreigners, or worse, corruption.
In addition to these pragmatic considerations, two addi-
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tional, more general and somewhat theoretical arguments have
been raised against mediation. First, mediation, which does not
result in a formal decision or award, does not contribute to the
development of ajurisprudence in the emerging field of interna-
tional investment law. Arbitration awards not only decide indi-
vidual disputes, they also contribute to developing the fabric of
this increasingly important area of international economic law.82
Widespread application of mediation would retard that develop-
ment. Mediation may allow investors and host country govern-
ments to avoid the burdens of unfavorable precedents, but
viewed from a more comprehensive perspective, this may not be
the best outcome.
Second, mediation of legitimate claims reduces the inhib-
iting effect of adverse arbitration awards on potentially illegal
governmental behavior. One of the purposes of signing interna-
tional investment agreements, it is said, is to impose a discipline
on governmental behavior and thereby foster a heightened rule
of law. A principal deterrent to such behavior is an international
arbitral award formally determining such behavior to be illegal
and imposing a significant sanction in the form of substantial
monetary damages. Mediating claims of illegality, rather than
adjudicating them in arbitration, could reduce the deterrent ef-
fect and thereby lessen respect for treaty provisions.
While these two reasons may have a certain theoretical justi-
fication, the same types of arguments can be made against ADR
in any domain affected by any branch of law. The primary pur-
pose of any dispute resolution system is to satisfy the needs of the
disputants. System development can only be a distant, secondary
aim. Just as mediation of domestic disputes will never replace
domestic courts, the application of ADR in investor-State dis-
putes will never replace arbitration. Some disputes, however, are
appropriate for resolution by ADR techniques. In those cases,
the advantages to the potential litigants and to the society at
large outweigh any theoretical disadvantages caused by the re-
sulting loss of a supposed useful precedent.
82. See Coe, supra note 29, at 25 ("Each new investor-state award becomes a part,
de facto, of a primitive system of precedent under which tribunals consult and give
various degrees of persuasive weight to the awards of other arbitrators.").
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CONCLUSIONS: ENHANCING THE ALTERNATIVES TO
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
If the number and cost of investor-State arbitrations have
become excessive, it is quite natural to ask how ADR processes-
namely, direct negotiations and mediation-might be enhanced
so as to attract aggrieved investors and host governments to use
them in lieu of international arbitration. While ADR is not likely
to replace international arbitration of investment disputes, it is
suggested that certain cases that now find their way to arbitration
might be settled more efficiently, effectively, and cheaply
through the application of ADR techniques. The following pro-
posals are offered as possible ways of enhancing ADR as a
method of investor-State dispute settlement.
A. Improved Education And Research About ADR
Applications To Investor-State Disputes
One reason why litigants have not had recourse to ADR in
investor-State disputes is that corporate executives, government
officials, and lawyers have not been educated about ADR tech-
niques and their potential application to investor-State disputes.
Accordingly, organizations concerned about investor-State dis-
putes, such as ICSID, UNCTAD, the ICC, and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), should make a con-
certed effort to undertake such an educational campaign. Un-
fortunately, these organizations do not yet possess the knowl-
edge and experience with ADR to offer such education on a
credible basis. It may therefore be useful to join forces with es-
tablished ADR centers to develop and carry out such educational
campaigns.
As a basis for any educational campaign, these institutions,
with appropriate academic support, should first conduct re-
search on the resolution of investor-State disputes through nego-
tiation and mediation. A better understanding of the anatomy
of investor-State disputes is needed: how they arise and evolve,
what actions tend to exacerbate the conflicts, at what point third
parties are best suited to intervene, and what kind of experience,
skills and resources are best suited to help resolve particular
types of investor-State disputes. In addition, finding and publish-
ing "success stories" in which ADR has proved effective will not
only enlighten executives, officials, and lawyers about the nature
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and use of these processes but will also encourage them to con-
sider the application of ADR to cases in which they are involved.
Appropriate institutions might also organize formal courses to
provide mediator training, so as to develop a corps of trained
professional mediators. As noted above, institutions engaged in
this educational process should avoid the bias that only lawyers
can be competent mediators.
B. Pro-Active Approach By Institutions
Institutions such as ICSID and the ICC that are engaged in
providing dispute resolution services should take a proactive ap-
proach in advancing the option of ADR techniques to litigants
who seek to have their cases resolved by international arbitra-
tion. This means that such institutions should do more than
provide a perfunctory notification of the possibility of mediation
to litigants at the time a case is registered. Officials of the institu-
tion should explore in depth with individual litigants the option
of mediation and advance various practical possibilities in this
regard. Moreover, once the tribunal in an arbitration case has
been constituted, it should, in the organizational phase of the
proceeding, explore the option of mediation with the parties.
Many courts in the United States have created annexed media-
tion services and have developed the concept of the "multi-door
court house;" that is, a court house that offers litigants a door to
mediation as well as to adjudication. ICSID and other arbitral
institutions might develop a similar "multi-door approach."
C. Early Intervention In Conflicts
It is generally believed that it is easier to effect a negotiated
settlement of a dispute if a mediator intervenes earlier rather
than later in the conflict. Once a dispute has been submitted to
international arbitration, the difficulties of its settlement in-
crease because of the dispute's resulting politicization, the hard-
ening of the disputants' positions, and the entry into the fray of
other government agencies who must now become part of any
settlement.83 As a result, host countries as well as investors
should develop policies that facilitate early intervention by
mediators, and dispute settlement institutions themselves might
83. See Legum, supra note 54, at 1.
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also seek to intervene in a dispute at an early stage. For exam-
ple, host country investment promotion agencies might see as
one of their functions the mediation of incipient disputes be-
tween foreign investors and host government departments and
create an office staffed by trained mediators to carry out this
function. It would seek to intervene in situations of potential
conflict between international investors and the host govern-
ment that risk developing into full blown investor-State disputes.
One of the obstacles to early intervention by central govern-
ment authorities is lack of knowledge by such authorities that an
action has taken place that potentially violates a treaty obligation
and may become the basis for an investor-state conflict. As indi-
cated earlier, many such actions are done by sub-national units
without the knowledge of the central government; consequently,
states should seek to develop systems that will keep relevant cen-
tral government agencies informed of sub-national actions af-
fecting foreign investors.
In addition, investment contracts between multinational
corporations and host governments might provide for specific
alternative dispute settlement in the event that conflict arises.
Such contracts might stipulate, for example, that no arbitration
may be launched until corporate executives and government of-
ficials have attempted and failed to negotiate or mediate dis-
putes.
D. Creation Of An International Investment Mediation Service
International institutions such as ICSID, MIGA, the United
Nations, and other respected organizations concerned with in-
ternational investment should consider the creation of an inter-
national mediation service consisting of a corps of experienced
international mediators who could be called upon to offer their
assistance in cases of disputes between investors and states. This
service might seek to intervene in disputes both before and after
they have been submitted to arbitration. It also might seek to
develop an early warning system that would keep the mediation
service informed of potential conflicts that might be amenable
to the application of ADR techniques.
E. Search For Ways To Associate ADR More With Arbitration
Efforts should be made to find ways to associate ADR more
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closely with the arbitration of investor-State disputes. Initially,
one may ask whether arbitrators themselves can and should seek
to facilitate a negotiated settlement of a dispute. On this ques-
tion, practice seems to vary considerably among countries. Gen-
erally, Americans and some Europeans consider it improper for
an arbitrator to facilitate a settlement of the dispute.84 In their
view, arbitrators should do no more than to suggest the possibil-
ity of settlement but should not actively engage in mediating ef-
forts. The reason for this reluctance is their fear that if arbitra-
tors' mediation efforts fail, they will have compromised their
ability to act as arbitrators because of the information gained
from contact made with the individual disputants, often in pri-
vate meetings." In Germany, however, arbitrators often take a
more active role by proposing possible formulas for settlement at
the parties' request, participating in settlement negotiations,
and even meeting separately with the parties with their con-
sent. 6 In Asian cultures, which have a particular aversion to ad-
versarial procedures, arbitrators are even more energetic than
their European and American counterparts in seeking to facili-
tate agreement among the disputants rather than merely impos-
ing a decision.87 Dispute settlement institutions should consider
the question of arbitrators acting as mediators. They might also
adopt rules that allow arbitrators to attempt to mediate investor-
State disputes in appropriate cases and with the full consent of
the parties.
In addition, arbitrators with the parties' consent in appro-
priate cases should encourage the appointment of a mediator
even while the arbitration is proceeding. Arbitrators should be
willing to cooperate with the mediator and facilitate his or her
task, for example, by allowing the mediator access to arbitration
documents and permitting the mediator to attend arbitration
hearings and sessions.
F. Enact Legislation Authorizing Host Country Officials To Use ADR
Since political considerations sometimes inhibit the use by
84. See CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: DESIGNING PROCEDURES FOR EFFECIvE CONFLIcr MANAGEMENT 193-95 (1996).
85. See id. at 203-08.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 198-99, 199 n.135 (providing more details on dispute resolution in
China).
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host country officials of ADR in investor-State disputes, host gov-
ernments should consider enacting legislation that specifically
authorizes, if not encourages, government officials to employ
ADR techniques in resolving such disputes. Appropriate budget-
ary line items for this purpose might also be developed to give
officials an incentive to use mediation and alternative methods
of dispute settlement in appropriate cases. In addition, to facili-
tate the management of investor-State disputes and the effective
application of ADR techniques to resolve them, legislation might
also specify the government agency that is to take charge of man-
aging investor disputes, negotiating settlements, employing ADR
specialists, and recommending negotiated settlements to the
government for final approval.
G. Revise Treaty Language To Encourage ADR
In Investor-State Disputes
Contracting States might seek to revise their existing invest-
ment treaties, as well as the treaty models they use in negotia-
tions, to incorporate specific language authorizing and encour-
aging disputants to employ ADR techniques to the maximum ex-
tent possible and making it clear that their intention in the
treaty is that disputants should resort to international arbitration
only after they are convinced that negotiations and various forms
of alternative disputes settlement would be unavailing. Such
treaty language might be as follows:
The Contracting States hereby authorize and encourage
the parties in the event of dispute to make maximum resort
to negotiation, voluntary third party procedures, and other
forms of non-binding alternative dispute resolution to settle
their dispute.
It is the intent of the Contracting States that parties to a
dispute with regard to the interpretation and application of
the present Treaty shall not resort to international arbitration
as provided under this Treaty unless they are both convinced
that negotiations, voluntary third party procedures, and other
forms of non-binding alternative dispute resolution would be
unavailing in reaching a settlement of their dispute.
If amending existing treaty language is not feasible, an ex-
change of letters between Contracting States to the effect that
the phrase "negotiations and consultation" includes the use of
ADR techniques might be considered. Under Article 31(3) of
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such subsequent
agreement may be taken into account in the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions.88
88. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 31(3), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.129/15, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986).
